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Political Science

Comparing the Campaign Financing Patterns of Male and Female Congressional Candidates
Faculty Mentor: Professor Christopher Muste
Nearly 100 years after gaining the right to vote, women are nowhere near reaching equal
representation in the United States Congress. Although this is likely due to a range of factors, the
possibility that women remain underrepresented because of a campaign financing disadvantage
is explored in this research. While there is a rich body of literature comparing how male and
female congressional candidates finance their campaigns, previous research has not compared
the net worth of male and female members of Congress or how net worth affects the amount of
campaign receipts a candidate receives. Additionally, the self-financing patterns of male and
female candidates and the effect of self-financing on campaign success for each gender have not
been explored.
This research addresses these gaps in the campaign finance literature by testing the
following four hypotheses: female members of Congress have lower net worth than male
members, wealthy members are able to capture a larger amount of campaign receipts than less
wealthy members, female candidates rely on self-financing more than male candidates, and
females who self-finance earn a lower percentage of the general election vote than male selffinancing candidates. My analysis reveals that a member’s net worth is positively correlated with
campaign receipts, so I can accept my second hypothesis. However, I must reject the other three
hypotheses and conclude that women do not appear to be at a significant campaign financing
disadvantage when net worth and self-financing are considered.
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Introduction
Nearly 100 years after gaining the right to vote, women remain severely underrepresented
in the United States Congress. As of January 2014, women hold 99 seats in the national
legislature (CAWP, 2014). Although this is the highest number in history, it is still only 18.5% of
the 535 congressional seats (CAWP, 2014). The implications of women’s underrepresentation
are numerous and complex. How can the U.S. Congress make decisions on behalf of all
Americans if its membership does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American
population? How can American women be sure that their unique interests and needs are being
considered if few women are at the decision making table?
Previous research investigating the behavior of women in the United States House of
Representatives concludes that female members are more likely than males to initiate legislation
focused on women’s issues (Gerrity, Osborn, & Mendez, 2007). Additionally, “The presence of
women in the legislature can substantially influence the items on the legislative agenda, policy
outcomes, and the tone of debate in government” (Bauer, 2013, p. 37). Because women make
unique contributions to the legislative process, it is reasonable to assume that the lack of equal
representation in the U.S. Congress is detrimental to the needs of American women. In order to
make strides toward equal representation, the reasons that parity has not been reached thus far
must be identified. A rich body of research exists that explores whether campaign financing
differences between male and female candidates puts females at a disadvantage. However, the
impact of male and female candidates’ net worth on campaign financing has not yet been
explored. Neither have the self-financing patterns of male and female candidates nor how selffinancing affects vote totals for each gender. The purpose of this research is to address these
gaps in the campaign finance literature. 1
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Prior Research
The ability of candidates to successfully raise funds is critical to campaign success.
Referencing a 1987 study by Gary Jacobson, Burrell (2003) states that, “How well candidates
preform on election day is a direct function of how much money they raise and spend” (p. 73).
In fact, in 93% of 2008 U.S. House races the top spender won the seat (Currinder, 2008).
Because of this strong relationship, campaign financing by female candidates has been the focus
of many scholars seeking to answer the question, are female candidates at a disadvantage
compared to male candidates? According to Burrell (2003), “The conventional wisdom has been
that women candidates have greater difficulty raising money than their male counterparts, and
this difficulty is viewed as a major reason why more women are not in elective office” (p. 74).
Despite this theory, there is a strong body of research that concludes that women and men are on
an equal playing field, and in some cases women are actually able to raise more money than
men.
Adams and Schreiber (2011) compare the campaign financing success of men and
women candidates at the local level. Focusing on municipal elections in seven cities, they found
that there are no significant differences between the backgrounds of male and female candidates,
the sources of their campaign funds, or their electoral success rates (Adams & Schreiber, 2011).
In examining the campaign financing patterns of candidates in local elections in Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina from 1975-1980, Ingalls and Arrington (1991) also conclude that women
are not disadvantaged in fundraising, spending, or receiving votes. In fact, the female candidates
studied actually received more votes for every dollar spent than the male candidates (Ingalls &
Arrington, 1991).
At the national level women do not seem to be disadvantaged either. Using campaign
finance data for major party candidates in the 1980 U.S. House general election, Schlozman and
Uhlaner (1986) conclude that the gender of the candidate alone does not affect the amount of
campaign receipts that he or she is able to collect. However, the fact that females are more often
challengers than incumbents does put women at a disadvantage, as challengers of both genders
are typically unable to gather as many contributions as incumbents are (Burrell 1994, as cited by
Burrell 2003; Schlozman & Uhlaner, 1986).
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While these pieces of research conclude that female candidates are not at a fundraising
disadvantage, there are differences in how males and females fund their campaigns. The rise of
female donor networks has altered the campaign financing landscape for female candidates, in
many cases giving women an advantage (Burrell, 2003; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia, 2001).
Female candidates who receive support from these networks are able to raise more donations
from individuals than male and female candidates who remain outside the network (Crespin &
Dietz, 2010). Women’s PACs such as EMILY’s List are particularly helpful in providing early
money to candidates, which can help them gather more contributions in the long run than those
without seed money (Francia, 2001). However, these donor groups tend to only benefit
Democratic women (Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia, 2001).
There appear to be differences in how male and female candidates gather donations from
individuals as well. Women tend to rely on small individual contributions to fund their
campaigns more than men (Baker, 2006; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991).
Female Democrats in particular rely on contributions from women, who often give smaller
amounts than men (Bryner & Weber, 2013). Could women candidates’ reliance on small
individual contributions be an advantage? While Ingalls and Arrington (1991) do not reach a
definitive conclusion, in their study they found that “…successful women candidates appeared to
have actively sought a broad, grass-roots approach” (p. 88). However, it has also been suggested
that female candidates have to work harder than males, using several different fundraising
methods and utilizing a variety of funding sources in order to fundraise equal amounts as men
(Jenkins, 2007). In sum, although there do not seem to be significant financial advantages for
candidates of one gender over the other, a closer look reveals that there are differences in how
males and females finance their campaigns.
A somewhat less explored but equally important aspect of campaign funding is selffinancing. Candidates are not limited as to how much money they can donate or loan to their
own campaigns (Sides, Shaw, Grossmann, & Lipsitz, 2013). That being said, “The lack of
spending limits means that candidates can fund their own campaigns, potentially giving wealthy
individuals a significant advantage over the less wealthy” (Sides et al., 2013, p. 107). Despite
this possibility, self-financed candidates do not tend to do well on election day (Alexander, 2005;
Boatright, 2009; Currinder, 2008; Steen, 2006). In the 2008 election, only three out of 24 U.S.
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Senate candidates who self-financed $1 million or more won their election (Boatright, 2009).
Incumbents rarely self-finance, while open seat candidates and challengers are more likely to do
so (Steen, 2006).
There are theories as to why self-financing is often associated with failure at the polls.
Steen (2006) posits that “…self-financers tend to be inexperienced, low quality candidates, so in
many cases their personal funds do little more than make them more competitive with their
stronger opponents” (p.122). Additionally, candidates who self-finance large portions of their
total funds rather than fundraise may miss out on the benefits that fundraising brings, such as
garnering attention from the media, (Steen, 2006) and forging relationships with voters
(Alexander, 2005; Steen, 2006).
Closely related to self-financing is a candidate’s personal wealth. Steen (2006) found that
“…self-financing is positively correlated with candidate wealth” (p. 125) and that “…selffinancers are significantly wealthier than other members of Congress” (p. 15). However, the
wealth of a self-financing candidate does not provide him or her with a significant advantage
since candidates who pour money into their own campaigns typically lose (Steen, 2006).
In conclusion, prior research comparing how male and female candidates finance their
campaigns has determined that there is not a significant difference between the total amounts
males and females are able to raise (Adams & Schreiber 2011; Burrell, 1994 as cited by Burrell,
2003; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991; Uhlaner & Schlozman 1986). Females rely on small individual
contributions more than males (Baker, 2006; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991),
and get an added boost from women’s PACs (Burrell, 2003; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia,
2001). Self-financers typically lose their elections (Alexander, 2005; Boatright, 2009; Currinder,
2008; Steen, 2006), and incumbents are less likely to contribute to their own campaigns than
challengers or open seat candidates (Steen, 2006). While the existing literature suggests that
women do not remain underrepresented in the national legislature because of campaign
financing, the differences between how males and females self-finance and how male and female
self-financers fare on election day have not been considered. Neither has the net worth of female
members compared to male members, nor how net worth is related to the amount of total receipts
a member was able to gather during his or her campaign. Thus, until these avenues are explored
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it is not possible to conclude that campaign financing is not affecting the level of women’s
representation.
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis that will be tested is that female members of the United States House
have a lower average net worth than male members. Because females nationwide have
historically earned less than males, it can be expected that female representatives have an
average net worth that is lower than males’. With lower incomes, females likely also have assets
with less value and more liabilities. However, it is possible that female members may have equal
or even greater net worth than male members. House candidates tend to have higher incomes
than their constituents (Steen, 2006). The female members in question not only ran for office but
won, suggesting that there may not be a gap between the net worth of male and female members
of Congress as there is between the incomes of the average male and female American citizen.
While it would be ideal to analyze the net worth of all candidates rather than just successful
candidates, net worth data for losing candidates is not readily available.
My second hypothesis is that wealthier members are able to collect a larger amount of
campaign receipts than less wealthy members. Wealthier individuals are likely part of a network
that includes other wealthy individuals. This would give wealthy candidates an advantage, as
they would have the opportunity to solicit large individual contributions from those within the
network. They also would be likely to have connections with corporations, PACs, and other
organizations which could donate large sums of money to the candidate. Additionally, it is
common knowledge that running for office is expensive and candidates who raise and spend
more tend to be more successful (Jacobson, 1987 as cited by Burrell, 2003; Currinder, 2008). So,
candidates with greater personal wealth may appear to be more viable to the media and potential
donors and thus amass a larger amount of total contributions. Net worth may affect the amount
of total campaign receipts differently for male and female candidates, so in addition to analyzing
the effect of net worth on campaign receipts for all candidates combined, the effect of net worth
on campaign receipts for males and females will be tested separately.
My third hypothesis is that female candidates rely on self-financing more than male
candidates. According to Jennifer A. Steen (2006), candidates who self-finance are typically
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challengers or open seat candidates rather than incumbents and they are often inexperienced.
Female candidates “have disproportionately been challengers” (Burrell, 2003, p. 79). Therefore,
it can be expected that female candidates rely on self-financing as a larger percentage of their
total receipts than male candidates do.
However, It is also possible that female candidates actually self-finance less often and in
smaller amounts than male candidates. If female candidates are less wealthy than male
candidates, they may not be able to afford to contribute as much or as often as males.
Additionally, females might not need to self-finance as often or as much as male candidates do.
Females tend to benefit greatly from early money contributed by women’s donor networks, an
advantage that male candidates do not have (Burrell, 2003; Crespin & Deitz, 2010; Francia,
2001). Ingalls and Arrington (1991) conclude that female candidates for local offices in
Mecklenburg County relied on self-financing less often then male candidates. This may hold true
at the national level as well.
Finally, my fourth hypothesis is that male candidates who self-finance capture a higher
percentage of the vote than female candidates who self-finance. If female candidates rely on selffinancing to make up a larger percentage of their total receipts than male candidates do, it can be
expected that self-financing female candidates are not as successful as self-financing male
candidates. Candidates who do not self-finance large amounts gather more contributions from
others than those who do self-finance (Steen, 2006). So, if male candidates self-finance a smaller
percentage of their total receipts than female candidates do they are likely to earn a higher
percentage of the general election vote than female candidates. However, it is possible that men
and women self-financers may experience different rates of success at the polls even if there is
not a significant difference between the raw amount or the percent that one gender self-finances
compared to the other. One gender may benefit more from the perks of fundraising described by
Steen (2006) and Alexander (2005), or voters may react differently to male and female selffinancers.
Data Collection and Methods
To test the hypotheses described above, I constructed a dataset including all 838 major
party candidates running in the 2012 U.S. House of Representatives general election. The
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following variables were coded for all cases in the dataset: district, region, candidate name,
candidate status (whether the candidate was an incumbent, challenger, etc.), gender, party
affiliation, percent of the general election vote received, and total campaign receipts. The
absolute amount and percentage of total receipts were coded for candidate contributions,
candidate loans, itemized individual contributions, unitemized individual contributions, other
committees contributions, party committees contributions, and transfers from authorized
committees. FEC financial summaries were not available for a handful of candidates, who were
excluded from the analysis as a result. For candidates who won their elections, data was also
collected for 2011 and 2012 net worth. Net worth data was available for 434 out of the 435
members of the U.S. House.
Data for candidate district, name, status, and party affiliation was retrieved from CNN
Election Center. The congressional districts were coded into one of four geographical regions
(West, Midwest, Northeast, and South) based on the U.S. Census Bureau regions. Candidate
gender was determined based on the list of female candidates provided by the Center for
American Women and Politics in “Women Congressional and Statewide Elected Executive
Candidates 2012.” Data on the percent of the general election vote received was retrieved from
the Federal Election Commission’s “Official Election Results for United States House of
Representatives.” All campaign finance data was collected using the Federal Election
Commission’s financial summaries found using the “Candidate and Committee Viewer” search
feature. Net worth data for 2011 and 2012 was collected from the Center for Responsive Politics,
which uses the financial disclosure reports filed by members of Congress to calculate these
figures. Net worth was collected for members only, rather than all House candidates in the
dataset, because net worth data for unsuccessful candidates is not readily available. Complete
citations of all data sources are listed in Appendix A.
Analysis
The hypothesis that female members have lower average net worth than male members
was tested first. A total of 434 cases were included in this analysis, 78 females and 356 males.
Net worth data was not available for one member of the House. Additionally, 2011 data was
available for Representative Jackson Jr. but 2012 data was not. As a result, Jackson Jr.’s 2012 net
worth was recorded as missing, and the 2011 value was used as his 2011-2012 average. I ran a
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comparison of means and t-test equality of means to determine whether or not there is a
difference in net worth for male and female representatives, and if so, whether this difference is
statistically significant.
The results of these tests indicate that females do have a lower net worth than males. The
mean net worth for female members stayed relatively constant between 2011 and 2012 but the
mean net worth for males decreased by roughly $.8 million during the same period. In 2011 male
members had an average net worth that was about $1.7 million higher than female members.
This difference between males and females shrunk to $840,370 in 2012. Because some
members’ net worth increased or decreased significantly between 2011 and 2012, I averaged the
2011 and 2012 net worth values for each member. I did so in order to gain a more general
measure of each candidate’s individual wealth and the wealth of members as a whole. Looking at
this 2011-2012 average net worth figure, male members’ mean net worth came in at $1.26
million more than the female members’ mean. However, the t-tests show that the differences in
means for males and females are not statistically significant. The p-values for 2011 (p=.712),
2012 (p=.813) and 2011-2012 average (p=.750) are all quite high (a p-value of .05 or lower is the
general standard for statistical significance).

Member Net Worth
Candidate Gender

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

M

356

7564566.85

40062311.914

2123298.285

F

78

5862473.08

15096374.821

1709327.851

M

355

6736774.93

30577327.854

1622876.058

F

78

5896405.13

15025509.356

1701303.917

356

7141630.4775

34292685.75064 1817508.70977

78

5879439.1026

15047828.07395 1703831.01419

Member Net Worth 2011

Member Net Worth 2012

M
Member Net Worth 20112012 Average
F
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In order to address the possibility that there could be differences in net worth between
parties or among geographical regions, I ran a comparison of means and t-test for the variable
“member net worth 2011-2012 average” with party affiliation as the grouping variable, and an
ANOVA with region as the grouping variable. While the mean net worth of Republican
members is $2.28 million higher than Democrats, this difference is not statistically significant
(p=.455). Regional differences exist as well. Members in the Midwest have a net worth of $2.71
million, the lowest of the four regions. Representatives in the West have the highest net worth, a
mean of $11.87 million. Falling in the middle are the South with a mean of $7.02 million, and
the Northeast with a mean of $5.26 million. Although these differences seem remarkable,
particularly between the Midwest and the West, the results of the ANOVA show that these
differences are not statistically significant (p=.225).
In sum, I cannot accept my hypothesis because the difference in mean net worth of males
and females is not statistically significant. However, as I predicted in my hypothesis, male
members on average are wealthier than female members. While there are differences in net
worth between parties and across regions, these differences are not statistically significant either.
The net worth of a member of Congress is only important if it affects the way a member
legislates or the success of his or her campaign. As noted in the literature review at the beginning
of this paper, wealth and self-financing are positively correlated (Steen, 2006), so in this way
wealth influences a candidate’s campaign strategy. Does personal wealth also affect the total
amount of money a candidate can raise? My second hypothesis is that the net worth of U.S.
House members and the total campaign receipts they collected during the two-year 2012 election
cycle are positively correlated. To test this, I recoded “2011-2012 average net worth” into a new
variable with two categories, “below mean” and “above mean.” I then ran a comparison of
means and t-test to determine whether the mean total campaign receipts collected in the 2012
election cycle differs for members with net worth above and below the mean. Once again, my
sample size was 434. After comparing the means it is clear that wealthier members were able to
capture more campaign money. Members with a net worth below the mean averaged $1,628,822
in campaign contributions, and those with a net worth above the mean averaged $2,205,361. The
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results of the t-test show that, with a p-value of .026, the difference is statistically significant at
the p=.05 level.
Recoding 2011-2012 average net worth into quartiles yields similar results. The mean
total campaign receipts increase from the first through the third quartiles (Q1=$1,386,671,
Q2=1,537,004, Q3=1,731,814) with a jump between quartile three and four (Q4=2,149,437). The
ANOVA test reveals that there is a statistically significant difference (p=.011) between the mean
total campaign receipts received when net worth is divided into quartiles. In order to identify
where this difference occurs, I ran a Scheffe post-hoc test. The statistically significant difference
lies only in the full range between the first and fourth quartiles (p=.020). Although there is a
jump between quartile three and four, this difference is not statistically significant.
After comparing the means, I performed a Chi-Square test as well as a Pearson
Correlation to test the strength and direction of the relationship between net worth and total
campaign receipts. For the Chi-Square test I split both net worth and total campaign receipts at
the mean. This test yielded a p-value of .030, demonstrating that there is a statistically significant
relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts at the p=.05 level. In contrast, the
correlation did not meet the p=.05 level of significance. With a Pearson Correlation coefficient of
.069 and a p-value of .153, the relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts is
positive, but not strong enough to fully reject the null hypothesis that net worth and campaign
receipts are not correlated.
While there appears to be a relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts,
does this relationship hold when the data is separated according to gender? Using the same mean
and quartile breaks determined when all candidates were combined, I split the data according to
gender and ran comparison of means tests. Surprisingly, there is still a relationship between net
worth and campaign receipts for male representatives but not for females. The mean total
receipts for females with a net worth below the mean is $1.98 million, compared to $1.96 million
for females with a net worth above the mean. These two values are virtually equal (p=.982).
When splitting females into quartiles based on net worth, there was once again no statistically
significant difference between the means (p=.713). The sample size of females with a net worth
below the mean is 10, and above the mean is 68, however the means are so close together that
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even with a large sample size the difference would not be significant. Clearly, for female
candidates net worth is not related to fundraising totals.
Males with a net worth below the mean (N=311) had a mean of $1.55 million in total
receipts while males with above average net worth (N=45) had a mean of $2.26 million in
receipts. This difference is statistically significant with a p-value of .004. When splitting the
males into quartiles based on net worth, the differences between the first and fourth quartile
(p=.002), second and fourth quartile (p=.023), and third and fourth quartile (p=.022) are
statistically significant. Although net worth is not related to campaign fundraising for females, a
strong relationship exists for male candidates. Male candidates with more wealth gather more
campaign receipts.
To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between net worth and total campaign
receipts, I created the scatterplot below:

There are four obvious outliers, two on the dependent variable and two on the independent
variable. Additionally, there is a borderline outlier on the independent variable at just over $200
million. Interested in determining whether the relationships described above hold true when
these outliers are removed, I decided to eliminate cases where campaign receipts totaled $20
million or more, or net worth exceeded $300 million. I decided to keep the case that looks to be a
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marginal outlier, with a net worth a little over $200 million. I kept this case in order to retain as
much data as possible and because it was not clearly removed from the rest of the data as the
other four cases were. The new scatterplot without the outliers is below:

Next, I ran a correlation between member average net worth 2011-2012 and total campaign
receipts, both genders combined, with outliers excluded.

Member Net Worth and Total Campaign Receipts Correlations
Member Net Worth
2011-2012 Average
Member Net Worth 2011-2012

Pearson

Average

Correlation

Campaign Receipts
1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Total Campaign Receipts

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Total

.231

**

.000
430

430

**

1

.231

.000
430

781

Thane 15

With the outliers removed there is a strong, positive relationship between net worth and total
campaign receipts. Once again I split the data according to gender and ran correlations. With the
outliers removed, the relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts is statistically
significant (for females this relationship is slightly weaker than for males).
Member Net Worth and Total Campaign Receipts Correlations
Member Net

Candidate Gender
F

Member Net Worth 2011-

Pearson Correlation

2012 Average

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Total Campaign Receipts

2012 Average

Receipts

1

77

*

1

.015

2012 Average

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation

*

77

Sig. (2-tailed)

Pearson Correlation

.276

.015

.276

Member Net Worth 2011-

Total Campaign Receipts

Total Campaign

Pearson Correlation

N
M

Worth 2011-

77
1

158
.222

**

.000
353

353

**

1

.222

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

353

623

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In conclusion, the relationship between a member of Congress’ net worth and the
amount of campaign funds he or she collects is present both when outliers are included and
excluded (when males and females are combined), however it is much stronger without the
outliers. When the outliers are included, the relationship is basically nonexistent for females
alone, but once these outliers are removed it is quite strong for both genders. Of the four outliers
I eliminated three were males. However, one was Michelle Bachmann. Bachmann was able to
amass nearly $26 million in funds for her 2012 House re-election bid but her net worth was not
so extraordinary. This is likely related to her run for President. Because the sample size for
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females was relatively small Bachmann’s presence had a large effect on the correlation.
Eliminating her and the other three outliers allows for a more accurate picture of the relationship.
In testing hypothesis one, I determined that there is not a statistically significant
difference between the net worth of male and female members. However, males elected to the
House in 2012 were wealthier than their female counterparts. If this relationship holds true for all
male and female congressional candidates, including unsuccessful candidates, females may be at
a disadvantage. As the results of the tests for hypothesis two indicate, when outliers are removed
net worth is positively correlated with campaign receipts for males and females separately as
well as candidates of both genders combined. So, if all female candidates beyond only those who
are successfully elected tend have a lower net worth than males, we can expect that they would
generally gather a smaller amount of campaign receipts. The gender differences in fundraising
may be even sharper among unsuccessful candidates. As noted in the literature review, typically
the candidate who spends the most wins (Burrell, 2003; Currinder, 2008), so it is possible that
having a lower net worth compared to males could put female candidates at a disadvantage.
My third hypothesis is that female candidates rely on self-financing more than male
candidates do. Cases included all major party candidates running in the 2012 U.S. House general
elections. For the Louisiana districts I included only the candidates who earned the highest and
second highest percentage of the vote, since more than two candidates are permitted to run in the
Louisiana general elections. My sample included 785 cases, 626 males and 159 females. While
my original dataset includes separate variables for candidate contributions and candidate loans,
for the purposes of this analysis these were combined into two variables, “self-financing absolute
amount” and “self-financing percent of total receipts.” Once again, I ran a comparison of means
and t-test on this data.
The results of my data analysis show that counter to my hypothesis, males actually selffinanced more than females in absolute dollars and as a percentage of total receipts. The mean
amount self-financed by males in the 2012 election cycle was $61,929, the mean amount selffinanced by females was $52,469. As a percentage of their total campaign contributions, males
self-financed a mean of 9.04% compared to 7.8% for females. However, the difference in the
mean absolute amounts is not statistically significant (p=.695), and neither is the difference in the
percent of total receipts (p=.473).
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After finding no significant differences in the mean percentages of total receipts and
absolute amounts that male and female candidates self-finance, I created a new variable by
multiplying the percentage and absolute values of self-financing for each case. This new variable
was created in an attempt to minimize the effects of two types of candidates: those who raise a
small amount of total receipts but self-finance a large portion of their receipts, and those who
raise a large amount of total receipts and self-finance a small percentage (but large raw amount)
of their total receipts. I performed a comparison of means and t-test for this new variable. The
mean value for males is $3,020,684 versus $2,106,379 for females. The difference between these
values is not statistically significant (p=.558), reaffirming the conclusion that male and female
candidates do not differ in their reliance on self-financing.
Suspecting that candidate status may influence a candidate’s likelihood of self-financing
more than gender does, I ran a regression with candidate status as the independent variable and
self-financing as a percent of total campaign receipts as the dependent variable. I held out
“incumbents” as the comparison variable for the regression. I removed one case from the dataset
that had a candidate status of “open seat/unopposed” in order to make it possible to run the test.
Regression: Candidate Status and Total Campaign Receipts
b

Model Summary
Model

R

1

.422

R Square

a

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

.178

.174

Durbin-Watson

17.64953

1.967

a. Predictors: (Constant), I/I, I/Unopposed, Open, Challenger
b. Dependent Variable: Self-Financing Percent of Total Receipts
a

ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares
Regression

1

df

Mean Square

52473.903

4

13118.476

Residual

242663.086

779

311.506

Total

295136.989

783

a. Dependent Variable: Self-Financing Percent of Total Receipts
b. Predictors: (Constant), I/I, I/Unopposed, Open, Challenger

F
42.113

Sig.
.000

b
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Coefficients
Model

a

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized

t

Sig.

Coefficients
B

1

Std. Error

(Constant)

.504

.966

Challenger

17.933

1.414

Open

10.389

I/Unopposed
I/I

Beta
.522

.602

.447

12.682

.000

1.908

.189

5.444

.000

1.514

3.221

.016

.470

.638

2.396

5.664

.014

.423

.672

a. Dependent Variable: Self-Financing Percent of Total Receipts

The results of this regression show that candidate status is a good predictor of the percent
of total funds a candidate will self-finance. Challengers self-financed 17.933% more of their total
receipts than incumbents did, and open seat candidates self-financed 10.389% more of their total
receipts than incumbents did. The difference between the percentage incumbents and challengers
self-financed is statistically significant (p=.000), so is the difference between the percentage that
incumbents and open seat candidates self-financed (p=.000). While the sample sizes for
challengers (N=292), incumbents (N=334), and open seats candidates (N=115) are moderate, it is
important to note that the sample sizes for unopposed incumbents (N=33) and incumbents
running against incumbents (N=10) are quite small, so it would not be sensible to draw
conclusions about these two categories based on this test. Even so, the percentage difference with
incumbents is extremely small. These results are consistent with Steen’s (2006) conclusion that
challengers and open seat candidates self-finance more than incumbents.
My final hypothesis is that male candidates who self-finance capture a higher percentage
of the vote than female candidates who self-finance. My theory behind this hypothesis is that,
since self-financing is equated with electoral failure (Alexander, 2005; Boatright, 2009;
Currinder, 2008; Steen, 2006), if females rely on self-financing as a larger portion of their total
receipts than males they will be less successful than male self-financers at the polls. The analysis
of hypothesis three clearly indicates that females do not rely on self-financing more than male
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candidates. In fact, although not statistically significant, males self-finance more in absolute
dollars and as a percent of total receipts. Although these results seem to undercut the fourth
hypothesis, it is still possible that self-financing could affect vote totals differently for male and
female candidates.
To test this hypothesis I selected high self-financers. I first ran a frequency of the “selffinancing” variable. Out of 785 candidates included in the dataset, 460 self-financed less than
.1% of their total receipts. I cut the remaining candidates in half, splitting them into “low selffinancers” (.1%-9.5%) and “high self-financers” (9.51%-highest value). Considering only the
high self-financers, I regressed the percent of the vote received in the general election on the
percent of total receipts self-financed, comparing women to men. The results of this regression
show that women who self-finance more than 9.5% of their total receipts earn a slightly higher
percent of the vote than men (40.056% compared to 38.999%), but this difference is not
statistically significant.
Regression: Self-Financing and Percent of the General Election Vote Received
Model Summary
R
Self-Financers
Percent = 1.00
Model
1

(Selected)

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

R Square

.034

a

.001

-.005

12.49879

a. Predictors: (Constant), Women Self-Financers Percent

a,b

ANOVA
Model
1

Sum of Squares
Regression

df

Mean Square

28.759

1

28.759

Residual

25151.384

161

156.220

Total

25180.143

162

a. Dependent Variable: Percent of Vote Received
b. Selecting only cases for which Self-Financers Percent = 1.00
c. Predictors: (Constant), Women Self-Financers Percent

F

Sig.
.184

.668

c
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Coefficients

a,b

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

38.999

1.092

1.057

2.465

Women Self-Financers
Percent

Coefficients
Beta

t

.034

Sig.

35.713

.000

.429

.668

a. Dependent Variable: Percent of Vote Received
b. Selecting only cases for which Self-Financers Percent = 1.00

To determine whether or not this conclusion holds true when considering raw dollars
self-financed instead of the percent of total receipts, I ran a frequency of absolute dollar amount
self-financed. Once again I split the data into three groups, those who did not self-finance at all,
those who self-financed less than $16,939, and candidates who self-financed $16,939 or more.
Only testing the “high self-financing” group, I regressed the percent of the vote earned on dollars
self-financed for women compared to men. Once again, the difference between the votes male
and female high self-financers received is not statistically significant. Women received 45.915%
of the vote compared to men’s 46.706%.
In order to definitively conclude that self-financing does not affect electoral success
differently for male and female candidates, I ran three final regressions on the combined percent
of receipts and raw dollars variable. Separating this combined variable data into “non-selffinancers,” “low self-financers,” and “high self-financers” I regressed the percent of the vote
received on each level of self-financing separately, comparing women and men. The differences
in the percent of the vote received for males compared to females in each of the three categories
were not statistically significant. In conclusion, I can reject both hypotheses three and four.
Female candidates do not rely on self-financing more than male candidates, and females who do
self-finance do not fare worse at the polls than males who self-finance. This is good news for
women interested in running for office. Because self-financers are often less viable candidates
and not as successful at fundraising (Alexander, 2005; Steen, 2006), the fact that women are not
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relying on self-financing more than men is a promising sign. It demonstrates that women are just
as viable and can be just as successful at fundraising as their male counterparts.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to determine whether women’s continued
underrepresentation can be partially explained by campaign financing disadvantages. While there
is a consensus among previous research that women are not at a financial disadvantage compared
to men (Adams & Schreiber 2011; Burrell, 1994 as cited by Burrell, 2003; Schlozman &
Uhlaner, 1986) and are sometimes at an advantage in financing their campaigns (Burrell, 2003;
Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia, 2001; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991), differences in males’ and
females’ net worth and self-financing had not yet been explored.
This research establishes a strong base for further comparisons of net worth and selffinancing between males and females. It was determined that the difference in the mean net
worth of male and female members of Congress in 2012 is not statistically significant, although
men are wealthier than women. To explore this in more depth, future research could aim to
compare the net worth of male and female members of Congress over the course of several
sessions. This would make it possible to see whether or not the gap between the net worth of
male and female members has expanded or contracted. Alternatively, the net worth of all male
and female general election candidates for the U.S. House, rather than just members, could be
studied. It is possible that the net worth of male and female members does not differ significantly
because they have already passed the election hurdle, but that it does differ for candidates
running in primaries and general elections. I did not expand my sample to include all candidates
in this research because net worth data was not available for all candidates, only for those who
won their election. It is possible to calculate net worth for all candidates based on their financial
disclosure reports, but based on the test cases I coded it would be very time consuming to do so.
Arguably the most interesting result of this research is that, consistent with my second
hypothesis, personal wealth is positively correlated with the amount of campaign receipts a
candidate can collect. When outliers are removed this holds true for all members combined as
well as when members are split according to gender. Steen (2006) concluded that personal
wealth does not give self-financers an advantage, because spending large amounts of their own
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money typically has negative consequences. However, the results of my research suggest that
wealthy candidates may have an advantage in raising campaign funds. Considering that the
candidate with the largest war chest tends to win the election (Currinder, 2008; Jacobson, 1987
as cited by Burrell, 2003), and wealthier candidates are able to raise more campaign funds than
less wealthy candidates, those with more personal money may have an advantage. Although this
theory cannot be tested with my dataset because net worth was only included for winning
candidates, it does provide an opportunity for future research. The relationships between the net
worth of all candidates, both successful and unsuccessful, the amount of total campaign receipts
collected, and the percent of the vote received, could be analyzed to determine whether this
theory is accurate.
While my third hypothesis stated that female candidates rely on self-financing more than
male candidates, my analysis reveals that this is not the case. Male candidates actually selffinance larger raw dollar amounts then females and rely on self-financing as a larger percentage
of their total campaign funds. However, these gender differences are not statistically significant.
This is good news for potential female candidates, as it likely means that women are able to
fundraise successfully and do not need to rely on their own funds in order to be competitive. For
those females who do choose to self-finance, they do not experience different success rates than
men who self-finance. According to Steen (2006), a large number of self-financing candidates do
not make it past the primaries. Future research could compare the self-financing patterns of male
and female primary election candidates and how male and female primary candidates fare in the
primary elections. Although there do not appear to be any differences in self-financing between
males and females in the general elections, there may be significant differences at the primary
level.
These results fit with the consensus provided by previous research that women do not
appear to be at a significant campaign fundraising disadvantage. If this is the case, why do
women remain underrepresented in Congress? Fox and Lawless (2004) suggest that not enough
women are running. After creating the Citizen Political Ambition Study and analyzing its results,
they concluded that eligible female candidates are less likely to think about running and to take
concrete steps toward starting a campaign (Fox & Lawless, 2004). Additionally, females see
themselves as less qualified for office than men do and fewer women than men are encouraged to
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run for office by a political figure (Fox and Lawless, 2004). The results of this study led Fox and
Lawless (2004) to conclude that women remain underrepresented because of a difference in what
they refer to as “political ambition.” Other scholars have similarly concluded that not enough
women are running for office (Adams and Schreiber, 2011; Burrell, 2005) which seems to be a
strong explanation for why women remain underrepresented. How can this ambition hurdle be
overcome? I agree with Schlozman and Uhlaner (1986) that women who believe they will
struggle to fundraise will refrain from running. Unfortunately, I also agree with Burrell’s (2003)
assessment that it is a widespread belief that women are at a campaign financing disadvantage. In
order to change this notion and prompt more women to run for public office, the research that
strikes down this popular view must be widely publicized.
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